danni naeil

Tag: Ukraine

  • Perspectives on the war in Ukraine

    Perspectives on the war in Ukraine

    I have been listening intently to a number of podcasts because of the war in Ukraine. One that is not mainly on the daily “progress” of the war, but rather from a higher perspective is The Ezra Klein Show from New York Times. I cannot recommend the episode with Timothy Snyder enough, for three reasons.

    One, it gives insight into the historical relationship (and lack of) between Russia and Ukraina and how Putin perceives this.

    Secondly, he asks what the democratic world would have done if the Ukrainians had laid down their weapons, the leadership fled the country and been easily subdued by the Russian army? What kind of anxious, existential crisis wouldn’t have taken place in Europe and North America? What criticizm would have been heard about the crisis of democracy, its’ inept ability to handle wars, to counter the deceptive and skilled authoritarian regimes?

    Third, Snyder says that every day the Ukrainians fight, they fight for the rest of us in the democratic countries. They give us a better chance to practicing democracy, of thinking about what a future we want for ourselves and others.

    Another guest on the same podcast is Masha Gessen, who discusses Putin’s rather twisted historical perspective on Ukraine and Russia. They have written a book on Russia that can be seen as interlinked with Snyder – Putin lives in the past, we must conquer the future.

  • Book review: Computational propaganda

    Book review: Computational propaganda

    Oxford Internet Institute is a go-to-zone whenever I need some knowledge about cyberspace, cybersecurity, Internet research or many other topics. It’s a fascinating interdisciplinary institute, blending what is called social data science, data science with social science (sociology or political science for instance), looking at algorithms, artificial intelligence, disinformation campaigns large scale. They have a score of PhD-students and scientists doing very interesting and exciting research. Occasionally, the scientists release books, such as this one: Computational propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media, edited by Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard. The book comprises case studies of digital disinformation efforts (a main focus is certain types of bots) in nine countries, ranging from Canada and Poland to Russia and, naturally, Ukraine.

    Ukraine was hit several times on a large scale, both by cyberattacks and computational propaganda. The Russians used bots of various kinds: impact and service bots, amplifiers, complainers and trackers. Research found that civil society drove the response, which was decentralized, in contrary to the centralized focus and power of the Russian attackers. Computational propaganda was used to manipulate opinion, sow discord, discredit various Ukrainian actors and support others.

    Russia is surprisingly interesting. It was, until about two weeks ago, a country where VKontakte and Yandex competed with Facebook and Google and were the bigger actors without an askewed market. But most fascinating is that the blogosphere, and parts of social media, rely on good reporting, which results in well-built fake news. In the blogosphere posts needed to have well-founded arguments and evidence “right away, preferably with detailed, often highly technical, reports on the matter”. If that failed, hackers were brought in to expose personal mails and grievances which could be exploited against journalists or the political opposition. It meant that evidence was very important. Since 2011 the situation has deteriorated though. Perhaps the abovementioned is why the Putin regime now has completely limited access to social media, to foreign sources of information, forbidden any reporting on the war, because evidence is not to be found, not to exploited by journalists or the opposition?

    As mentioned, bots are used in various ways on the Internet, and comprise a fairly large focus in several chapters, one reason being “bots […] can operate at a scale beyond humans”. In the chapter on Canada, election interference becomes an issue in the illusive question “how can free speech be weighed against foreign interference?” How can national authorities and legislation know a foreign actor isn’t buying bots to spread information in an election, or even know parties or affiliates aren’t using bots or cyborg accounts (humans and programs together) to affect the election? Julia Slupska wrote purposefully about this, discussing the fine lines of foreign interference in elections, national sovereignty, freedom of speech, the right to reflect and make choices on our own, and how liberal democracies made attempts to limit digital interference with elections. Bots complicate online speech drastically, because anyone can use bots and cyborg accounts: parties, citizens, companies, organizations. And who is to say who is a citizen, by the way, and who constitutes a foreign interest?

    Taiwan has tried media literacy as a way to counter desinformation compared to, for instance, Canada. In both countries “positive” bots are deployed to fact-check news (which, by the way, is how some journalists work, by deploying bots to check facts before publishing news).

    Zeynep Tufekci has written about activists and the same conclusions about them can be drawn here: human rights activists and alike are targeted and trolled with, especially public ones. When the Euromaiden protests broke out in 2014, activists were instantly barraged, with harassments and threats raining down on them. Fake accounts, bots and foreign interests makes it very difficult to know who exactly is behind the wall. Still, do people change their opinions, and if so, when?

    Many of the authors have interviewed people inside various companies (PR, software developers, media companies etc), which brings an interesting insight into how fake accounts are set up, bought/sold, how bot networks work, how they track and generate data on social media users, how agenda setting and opinion targeting are really working.

    Three conclusions in, and a fourth from, the book:

    1. Focus on what is said rather than who is speaking.
    2. Social media must be design for democracy.
    3. Anyone can use bots.
    4. For computational propaganda to work, it’s necessary to influence opinion leaders (on social media) and the agenda setting media. Study how Steven Bannon worked before the election to the European parliament in 2019 or watch The Brink.

    If ever you find yourself in need of a deep introduction on computational propaganda, this book is a necessity.

    —

    Night and blur – The Bilinda Butchers

  • Russian cyberwar in the dark forest?

    Russian cyberwar in the dark forest?

    Russia has been turned into a dictatorship in two weeks. No journalists are allowed to mention the word “war” in combination with “Ukraine”, resulting in several journalists or news agencies shutting down their activity or agreeing to self-censorship. Many foreign journalists are thus going home for fear of their reporting being in conflict with these hard measures.

    Protesters face fines, but also being conscripted and sent to the frontlines of the war, in a very cruel irony. Furthermore, the Russian authorities are shutting down or blocking access to various social media. They still lack the capacity to hunt down everything said and written, so they resort to complete blocking, I guess. Simultaneously they can use Internet Research Agency (IRA) and others to spread disinformation about the war, foreign interventions and try to gain support for this military operation (Z, anyone?). Lastly, they have the opportunity to limit the influence of foreign actors.

    Many are surprised the Russians haven’t attacked, or crushed, Ukraine through cyberwar yet. This was expected regarding all the attacks Ukraina has endured since (at least) 2015: attacks on energy plants, the electric grid, authorities, banks and so on. It was also expected because of the Gerasimov doctrine (Gerasimov happens to be highest ranking military (as I understand it)) in Russia, overseeing the invasion of Ukraine.

    There are things destabilizing the Internet, such as cyberattacks on authorities, power plants and a virtual flood of spam mail, though nothing (yet) near the total cyberwar between nation states. One important aspect complete havoc has not hit us could be linked to the dark forest theory.

    The dark forest theory is developed by science fiction writer Cixin Liu in the second book of The Three-Body Problem Trilogy (spoiler alert ahead!): The Dark Forest. In my eyes it could be applied here, even if it originally concerns cosmic civilizations. Instead of a dark forest inhabitated by scattered civilizations, we see a planet with many different countries in various stages of cyber capabilites. The three strongest are the US, Russia and China. The former two are in economic war, and the US supports a fourth nation being attacked by Russia militarily. The US also has allies in the form of the Five Eyes (the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) and the EU (which is not a cyber power in itself). On the outskirts are enemies of the US, North Korea and Iran, to keep it simple.

    Russia attacks Ukraine and the US declares its support of Ukraina, all in concert with the EU. The Five Eyes have exposed the Russian planes for months and boosted the Ukrainian defense for years, both military and the cybersecurity. All eyes are focused on Ukraine and Russia. So, to apply the dark forest theory here, all nations are separate persons sitting or standing next to a tree each, in a dark forest. Every single one is a hunter and game at the very same time. (Even if, for instance, the US, Russian and China are comprised of several agencies and authorities (and companies) each, they are reduced to one person here.) The nations/persons have all surveilled and hacked one another for years now, so they know pretty well who sits or stands next to a tree, and about where that tree is situated. Now they are poised for stronger, more devastating cyberattacks than ever before, perhaps on such a scale that it can cripple an entire person for years to come. And they can’t afford more than one chance, here meaning they have three choices:

    1. Sit/stand still
    2. Shoot
    3. Run

    The first implies trying to hide and remain, in best case, undetected, or it means remain vigilant but inactive.

    The second means attacking, thus revealing and exposing themselves by standing up and shooting. Everyone in the dark forest will instantly hear the shot. The closest, or most able, will even see the shot, perhaps even the shooter.

    The third means trying to relocate and, if succesful, hide behind another tree. It entails standing up, running, avoiding being shot and hiding behind another tree, hopefully not to close to another person.

    Unlike a real person, Russia can cause some minor disturbance for others, just like other nations might cause small disturbances, because they are comprised of so many smaller actors within themselves. But still, the nation has only have one single chance of doing something powerful: taking down an opponent/enemy.

    What upsets the dark forest theory here is allies. In the original dark forest theory there is no such thing as ally or friend. Everyone is a mortal enemy. Russia has no allies to speak of. The US is in a group of five, and aligned beside them are friendly allies, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Let’s say Russia chooses to attack the US, wreaking havoc in revenge for the support of Ukraine. They can take down some agencies, companies, municipalities and cripple many others. But since the Americans aren’t all situated in the US, many cybercapabilites will remain (the opposite is also true, though the Russians have fewer capabilites abroad). And most importantly, the allies will definitely attack Russia in turn. Since Russia has no allies, they will be the quarry.

    To speak with dark forest theory: Russia can choose to shoot. But they cannot run to another tree. They will turn from hunter to game the moment they reveal themselves. They will be fatally shot and destroyed by all the other hunters in the forest (especially considering how strained their other capablities are: military, economy, clout). That’s why I believe (and I could be very wrong) there has been no cyberwar to speak of so far (that we’ve seen). Russia simply cannot attack without being completely destroyed.

    Another main reason for this is the approach formulated by former secretary of defense Jim Mattis. In 2018 he outlined a new approach by the US in case of a major, devastating cyberattack: to consider such an attack as a nuclear attack, thus reciprocate with nuclear weapons. This is something the Russians know. Of course, this concerns an attack on the US itself, but where to draw the line when cyberattacks on one actor can spread unintentionally to others?

  • State of the world after one week of war in Ukraine (Revised May 5th)

    State of the world after one week of war in Ukraine (Revised May 5th)

    It’s been one week of war now. One week of immense sorrow. One week of reading more news than ever before in such a short time: Zelensky, Putin, Kiev, Kharkiv, Cherson, Territorial Defense Unit/Brigade, women signing up for frontline duty – the list in my dreams and nightmares go on and on.

    To follow the news, is to me like watching a shockwave of power and momentum in real time, the epicenter being Washington DC. From that epicenter comes an immense wave of power in the shape of diplomacy and soft power, flowing in all directions simultaneously. Many countries are caught in the flow, some resist. I’ve read news, especially after president Joe Biden’s speech to the congress, that the USA is not standing in the frontline this time, defying the prevalent thought that Americans are always at the forefront in confrontations, leading the “free world” towards a new goal. That they are weaker now. I couldn’t disagree more. Biden and Blinken (and so many others) have done a marvelous job of outing the Russian plans, playing the game of spies against spies. They remind me of president George H.W. Bush and James Baker III when they saw the Soviet Union and its’ satellite states collapse: seem unaffected outwardly while being busy and occupied with diplomacy and behind-the-scenes actions to make sure the system collapses as smoothly as possible. Biden and Blinken are using the goodwill of being right about Putin, and the badwill of Putin and his actions, to amass the strongest economic and political alliance in history. The goal is twofold.

    Firstly, the US is intent on destroying Russia as a great power once and for all by isolating them from the rest of the world as much as is possible, daring Putin to let Russia become a vassal state of China. Since China is extremely much stronger than Russia, those bilateral negotiations and relations will not be in Russia’s favour, ever. The wolf warrior diplomacy will put Putin at China’s mercy, no matter the nuclear weapons. Russia is in decline in almost all ways, whereas China is now becoming a super power stronger than the Soviet Union ever was.

    Secondly, when Russia is weakened and the debris is left in Siberia, the US will turn to China. Aligned beside them will be the European union with all its economic might, now stronger militarily than ever before, South Korea, Japan and many other countries, especially in South East Asia. The goal here is to force the Chinese to negotiate on the Western terms, to stop the wolf warrior diplomacy and make them see that a war on Taiwan is out of the question. The hegemon (the US that is) will remain in its’ place.

    That notorious Russian security meeting last week had me thinking a few things. One: Putin seemed affronted and angry. Perhaps because all his secret plans had been thwarted, that communications had been constantly intercepted and used against him by the Five Eyes. There might be leaks even. Two: Democracy in Ukraine must not last. A democratic country which succeeds where his authoritarian, semi-dictatorship country fails is never to be tolerated. Three: It seems his friends there didn’t agree with him. Perhaps they’re more well-informed about the risks they’re taking, both by attacking Ukraine and by saying no to Putin. Catch 22. But it angered him and all things considered made him make the decisions to attack.

    Perhaps there are many other reasons I/we don’t know and may never know. Still, I presume there are some strong disagreements in the Kremlin leadership.

    The response to the Russian invasion and attack has been stronger than I ever imagined. In the way of the reception of (and preparation for) refugees, which could have been a goal for Putin: let enough refugees into the EU and it might crumble, since the last refugee crisis in 2015 put the union through some serious hardships, and help right-wing extremists in France into power. In the way of swift (no pun intended) economic sanctions. In the way of military aid, like in Sweden, where the government and (now) all parties have decided to send weapons to a warzone for the first time since 1939. That says something about the threat European countries feel, disregarding all these foolish claims that Russia is threatened by every Western country, giving Russia the right to decide who should cooperate with who.

    It seems Emanuel Macron has been right all along, preaching about a stronger military force within the European Union, that the EU must be able to tackle things on its’ own. I’ve concurred before and I do it again. Thank you, Putin.

    I’ve heard politicians call for the extradiction of all Russian citizens from Sweden, which is an absurd proposal. To extradict people seeking asylum, a new life, or any other reason, for just being Russian citizens is against logic, against reason and won’t do the cause for Ukraine, for democracy any good. It’s rather to revert to the historical mistakes of old (and new): the internment of people with Japanese heritage in the US during World War II, the hatred towards Germans in the US during World War I. It smells of racism. There’s also the usual fallacy of thinking of citizens of one country being potential spies or weaknesses. As if Swedish citizens couldn’t be traitors or damage our country (the same goes for any country). The worst traitors and spies are usually found within a countries own population.

    Other very disturbing news, unfortunately not unexpected though I hoped for better: African students and migrants being treated very poorly by Ukranians and Poles. Considering how quickly and forcefully Poland organized a reception for millions of Ukrainians, and how forcefully they opposed refugees from Syria and the Middle East in 2015, I’m not surprised. Somehow, though, when you read news about all the heroic, fantastic deeds of the Ukrainians, one expects them to be saints in every way. That is never true for any people. The situation is so dire and awful, blatant racism in the form of refusing help and aid to Black people is sad, disturbing and wrong. People fleeing the war should receive help, no matter their origin or citizenship.

    People claim the Russians will win. Define win and victory, I say. Historically, the Russians haven’t fought a war without severe losses and/or humiliation in modern times. The Russo-Japanese war ended in humiliation and defeat. World War I ended in humiliation, defeat and system collapse. Russia was defeated by Poland in 1920. World War II was “won” by the death of millions of soldiers and inhabitants, in numbers perhaps more than any other nation ever. Afghanistan ended in humiliation. And so did Chechnya. The United States has the most powerful military the world has ever seen. They can deploy troops everywhere and have ousted many regimes for more than a century now, in some spectacular and extremely efficient ways. But even they have severe problems occupying countries. If the great historian Putin had read real history he would know how some of those occupations ended.

    So how can Russia possibly win? If the rest of the world lets them fight there by turning a very blind eye and by turning everything in Ukraine, the very country he was supposed to save, to dust and smithereens. By turning Ukraine into Stalingrad, which is very ironic, in a twisted, bleak way. By letting Russian men die in the hundred of thousands, and Ukrainians in the millions.

    I sincerely hope I won’t be writing any more about this war again, that it is over next week, but it seems a faint and vain hope. I would like the war to stop any minute, no more people dying, whether they be citizens in Ukranian cities, towns and villages preparing to fight and die for their freedom from Russia, or young Russian soldiers lying dead on the ground, covered by snow.

  • Book review: This is how they tell me the world ends

    Book review: This is how they tell me the world ends

    What is a zero-day? You may have heard news involving zero-days or zero-day exploits without actually reading those words, or you actually have read about zero-days, such as the Pegasus Project and the NSO Group? Someone clicks on a link in a text or message and voila! they’re hacked. The device is spied upon and/or controlled by someone else. Apparently, this someone doesn’t even need to click anymore. An unseen text or message is sent to your device and it’s no longer really yours anymore.

    Nicole Perlroth is an American journalist focused on cybersecurity and digital espionage and did recently release her first book, This is how they tell me the world ends.

    A zero-day is an unknown (security) flaw in software, like an operating system or program. This flaw can be exploited by someone, most likely to hack into this operating system or program. Mostly she writes about the invisible market and marketplace for zero-days, “the blood diamonds” of the security trade coveted by actors: nation-states, companies, developers, criminal networks. There are terrifying aspects to these exploits, some of which I’ll never tell friends or family, involve developing really nasty spyware or weapons to sabotage elevators, cars, jet fighters, the electric grid, power plants and you name it. A well-planned attack can send a country back to the analogue age. A well-planned and well-executed attack can annihilate enough date to destroy the state itself.

    Perlroth’s way of writing is that of a thriller and she revels in it. I find it refreshing, though I think the reader needs to be aware of how she portrays the people she meet, talks to, the details they reveal to her. There’s no protagonist to save us from impending, lurking doom. Instead Perlroth is present, almost like a character in this real-life thriller guiding us through how Ukraine has been attacked by (terrifying) NotPetya, the (fascinating) Project Gunman, (the amazing) Stuxnet – it’s all here, like classic novels. How China breached Google, the perpetual Russian intrusions and the Shadow Brokers stealing the arsenal of National Security Agency (NSA) are also told. She traveled to Ukraine to witness repercussions of cyber warfare. She talked to former bosses at the NSA, American secretaries of defense, the Finnish president, companies attempting to create a proper market for zero-days (or the fixes of them), mercenary coders working for the United Arab Emirates, Argentinian hackers in Buenos Aires. She went to congregations with men selling zero-day exploits, encountering the fucking salmon – that which should not be brought into the light.

    What she finds is also an expanding interest for zero-days, the intelligence and security agencies desire to breach cybersecurity of hostiles and friends, and nation-states willing to arm themselves with digital weapons. Details may be missing, words exaggerated, but I can accept them. Writing for laymen is difficult and overall it’s the sum of the parts that matter: the system, the sophistication, the evolution.

    Writing about tech can easily evolve into thrillers because of technical details, opaque and mystified to most people, and the thrill of spies and people lurking in shadows, forbidden spaces. I’m not one to read thrillers, but this thriller-like book I like. It’s long, intriguing, exciting, disturbing and in the shadows lurk horrible things that do happen and can happen. And if you happen to be interested in the zero-days market, there’s virtually no other book to read. So, go ahead.

    You – Regard, Troye Sivan & Tate McRae