Blog

  • Book review: Weapons of math destruction

    Book review: Weapons of math destruction

    This is a mandatory book during a course on democracy, that I actually read approximately three years ago and thus never reviewed (this website didn’t exist then), so I thought it was time for a proper review.

    Cathy O’Neil is a computer scientist and mathematician, who left the academic life for the financial industry in the early 2000’s, working with computers, for companies making lots of money. There she discovered what is now called Big Data and later became troubled by the purposes and intents of algorithms. After realising the even more troublesome side effects on society, she thus wrote this book, with the secondary title How Big Data increases inequality and threatens democracy.

    Through ten chapters, O’Neil takes the reader through what a data model is and how it can affect people in real life, such as the effects of university ranking models and the possibility of getting an adequate education, evaluations of teachers, online advertising, criminal injustice and justice and getting insurance, among other things. How come a data model deems a teacher unsuccesful or a job applicant unfit? Is the model correctly constructed or does it inherit its lack of perspective, and mathematical incoherence, from the creator? Data models with destructive effects on people’s lives are what she calls weapons of math destruction, WMD.

    In large, I agree with her and appreciate her arguments and conclusions. Negative feedback loops can infer that black men are more prone to commit crimes because the police has indicated black neighbourhoods as more exposed to petty crimes, sending police patrols to these neighbourhoods rather than white communities with more hidden crimes not marked on a map. This kind of feedback loop creates or maintains inequalities, which have destructive consequences for society.

    Sometimes, though, she contradicts herself. The extremes in statistical data are more likely to be pointed out and punished, she writes, although she also writes (rightly) that black men become an average in criminal statistics, simply being the median and mean, rather than the extreme. In a black community with more black men than white men, black men are the average. In a sense, being an average person, financially for instance, in a big data model can be very punishing, while being an extreme in form of extremely rich is better.

    On average (huh!) though, this book is still highly relevant, even though we’ve moved into the “age of AI”. AI-programmes rely on the same errors and statistical inferences as the programmes O’Neil discusses. Personally, I think the book is good for social scientists. She presents statistical models used by scientists and businesses, and how easily they can turn into stupid models discriminating people. It’s nice to get a mathematicians perspective and logical thinking.

    Conclusion: It still stands. Brief as that.

  • Studies proceeding

    Since roughly one month I’ve been attending the master programme in political science, first semester, and I must admit it’s delightful.

    Within these frames I’ve been able to delve into quantum computers and, now, the consequences of spyware in democracies. It’s a blessing being able to spend so much time pondering, writing and discussing various issues related to politics. Rarely have I felt so priviliged, so free to express my concerns for democracy, for the state of the world.

    Almost two years remain of this wonderful period of time.

  • Book review: The creativity code

    Book review: The creativity code

    Marcus du Sautoy is a British mathematician, who’s published several books on mathematics, appeared on TV and is highly regarded as an educator. He released a book in 2018 called The creativity code: How AI is learning to write, paint and think (du Sautoy is very fond of the word code in general, like in human code and creativity code), where he writes and ponders on the meaning of artificial intelligence and its implications for culture. He begins with admitting his existential crisis, devoting his life to mathematics, and realising AI might make computers superior to humans, rendering his skills inadequate and insufficient, even unnecessary.

    First, the book focuses on how different artificial intelligence programs are created and function. He retells the famous story of DeepMind (Google DeepMind since 2014) and its advances in machine learning and AI, with examples such as AlphaGo and AlphaFold. Du Sautoy connects this urge to create AI with the human urge to create books/stories, paintings and music, then adds philosophical notions and ideas about what constitutes free will, action and philosophical reasoning. How can we be sure a program is thinking or acting by its free will versus a human? Are humans programmed to act in certain ways, and how much do we act out of free will?

    ChatGPT has been prone to hallucinate, a phenomenon Kevin Roose wrote about, and the program has been limited to a certain number of responses after that. Du Sautoy mentions this (remember that the book was published five years ago) likelihood in generative AI, that they resemble drunk people fumbling in the dark. Or like Grumpy Old Geeks put it, like a guy drinking too many beers, going “Aaah, fuck it!”.

    The inability to comprehend why something happens or how somethings happens in a computer program, creates ambiguity, insecurity or outright hostility towards artificial intelligence. Why an AI-programme woke up in the middle of the night was incomprehensible, thus creating a sense and foreboding of algorithmic apocalypse. Music and mathematics are closely related, and he mentions several attempts to use artificial intelligence to create music, like an app created by Massive Attack.

    DeepDream is an attempt to understand the algorithms of machine learning and avoid incomprehensible black boxes. This relates to the robots created by Sony Computing Laboratory. These robots are teaching each other how to name their own movements, to communicate with each other, creating a conundrum for the humans watching, as they don’t understand the words unless they also interact with the robots. To guarantee there are no bugs or errors in the code, however, is an increasing issue and challenge.

    An example of a black box is the hunt for mathematical theorems. A program spits out new theorems. The issue? No one can understand them, because they’re not told, simply lines of mathematical “code”, so to speak. No mathematician can understand what the lines actually mean. Is this kind of AI necessary or useful? Just like du Sautoy writes, mathematics needs to be told, needs to be storified, otherwise it’s incomprehensible nonsense.

    Does one need emotions and the sense of physical space to understand? Does one need this understanding in order to be able to communicate with others about it? He gets philosophical, but that’s a necessary approach if we’re to comprehend artificial intelligence and its’ effects on society, rather than talk about technical details and functions.

    At the end, du Sautoy returns to his anxiety, his existential crisis, about computers excelling at mathematics (and physics), but he also states that mathematics is infinite, whereas humans are not. Perhaps that’s why we need AI, he asks, because mathematics is larger than us.

  • Book review: The Russo-Ukrainian War

    Book review: The Russo-Ukrainian War

    I’ve reviewed The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine before – a completely outstanding book about Ukraine, author being historian Serhii Plokhy. This is the second book of him I review, a very contemporary, and initially, personal account of The Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning a few days prior to the full-scale invasion and war.

    I truly appreciate Plokhy introducing the reader to a very brief and coherent history of Ukraine, before continuing to the actual war itself. Initially, Plokhy gives us a personal account of the very beginning of the full-scale war initiated by Russia on the 24th of Februari 2022. As a reader, I can feel his anxiety and connection to the nation assaulted by a larger, dangerous and ruthless neighbour.

    Plokhy provides us with Ukrainian and Russian sources, and therefore accounts of what Vladimir Putin actually did say, or might have said, on certain occasions, which puts things into perspective. The infamous televised meetings, publications, and public speeches and debates are briefly mentioned here, giving us a precious insight into the Russian debate on which nations are perceived to belong to the Russian nation (or empire, if you will): Belarus, Kazakstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia. Perhaps Armenia and Azerbaijan. This facilitates, for instance, the comprehension of recent Russian threats and discourse on armed nuclear attacks on European capitals.

    The book provides historical insights, and retrospect accounts of Ukraine’s position in the Soviet Union, the aftermath of the Cold War and the beginning of the 2000’s, with the Orange Revolution, EuroMaidan and first invasion of 2014-2015 at its focus. All this, puts the war into a context and provides the reader with a coherent comprehension of what has happened prior to the war beginning last war and why Ukraine is attacked by Russia.
    In between, Plokhy depicts the invasion, the initial Ukrainian reaction, the responses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and president Volodomyr Zelensky, and the population. Then, the Russian onslaught on Kiev, Butja, Charkiv and Mariupol take centrepiece.

    The relationship between China and USA are later discussed, and this is one of the best parts of the book. I’ve spent an entire semester studying China and have read a lot about US history, presidents and political system, and might claim I’ve got a fairly good perception of what’s happening in the Pacific Ocean, as well as between the countries. Plokhy’s account of the tension, but also dynamo, between these two titans is very relevant to this war, China being able to use Russia for its own purposes, while being an uncomfortably ally, and the US taking a fierce stance against Russia, while not wanting to completely antagonising its perceived and dedicated main rival.

    Plokhy can, in other words, really put things into perspective, and for this I’m grateful. Considering the stress and time-pressure this book was written, it’s impressive.

    Three downsides of the book from a needy reader

    There’s several maps in the introduction to the book. The absence of maps in the chapters is one downside, since a lack of visual, detailed maps next to the text turns the reading experience into a constant page-turning event, if one is prone to check the whereabouts of an event. This becomes almost a confusing experience during the chapter explaining the Ukrainian offensives towards Cherson and near Charkiv. Is the town of Izium in Cherson oblast, or in or close to Charkiv oblast? Is Mykolaiv close to Cherson or Charkiv? If you’re familiar with the maps from the Institute for the Study of War you might know, but if not, you’re usually lost.

    Another downside is the assertive focus on the Ukrainian side. Don’t get me wrong, I strongly support Ukraine and want them with borders restored to pre-2014 and the dignity of the nation-state of Ukraine restored. I want the civilians to be able to live their lives without Russian interference. And I want peace for Ukraine, on their own terms.
    However, that doesn’t mean the book should focus so much on Russia’s losses and troubles on the front. I’ve listened to, and read texts, Ukrainian troops describing how they loose people in trenches and foxholes, for instance last summer during heavy and intense Russian artillery fire, or soldiers entering a forest and losing approximately 75 % of the soldiers in a very short time. Reading the book you wrongly get the picture of only Russia suffering heavy losses, which has been far from the case. Unfortunately.

    Thirdly, I’d include the lack of gender perspective, but this is only because I’m a very needy reader. Plokhy is a very (I need to stress very) competent writer and historian. But during this war I really feel the absence of gender perspective. This winter Lisa Bjurwald released Slava Ukraini! Womens resistance to Russia’s War. It deals with women’s resistance against Russia, the systemic repression, rapes and violations against women perpetrated by Russia’s armed forces, the Ukrainian women’s part of the armed forces, civilian and volunteer forces and importance for the nation of Ukraine. It’s bleak and very dark on the one hand, but also positive, good and hopeful. This recognition of specifically women is hard to come by in wars, although I also lack, generally, the real understanding and insights of men being sacrificed by superiors on the fron.
    All in all
    So far, this might be the only book that compresses the first year of the war in a reliable and proper way.

  • The debate on refugee espionage

    Refugee espionage, according to Swedish law, is when a person unlawfully, secretly and systematically, over time, gathers information about someone else in order to provide a foreign power this information. It’s been part of Swedish law since the 1940’s and Sweden is one of the few countries to actually prohibit this action.

    There’s research on transnational repression and digital transnational repression, for instance by The Citizen Lab, Marcus Michaelsen, and Siena Anstis and Sophie Barnett. Authoritarian countries spend resources and time to repress diasporas, dissidents and vocal ex-citizens, whether by physically collecting information and threatening them, or by using the Internet.

    How does the Swedish parliament and media debate refugee espionage since 2014, when the law was revised? Does the debate connect refugee espionage to the digital ways of surveilling and repressing people? What does it say about national security and Swedish sovereignty?

    This is my bachelor’s thesis in political science. You can find it here, although it’s only available in Swedish.

  • The emperor is all but draped in paper

    The emperor is all but draped in paper

    When Russia invaded Ukraine, approximately 95 % of its regular army was there. Only 5 % remained inside Russia. To this day, approximately 200.000 Russians have been killed or wounded in the war. That’s almost the same number as Russian attacked Ukraine with. Now, private military companies are not obliged to reveal their losses, and the Russian military always downplays its losses, meaning even more losses could be the fact.

    When Prigozhin’s Wagner troops began their sprint towards Moscow on Friday/Saturday, they were 25.000, 5.000 of them being a vanguard. The regular forces suffered casaulties against the 5.000 Wagnerites and it’s said that Wagner tried to reach former veterans inside Moscow in order to recruit them. So, could Putin have resisted?

    Vladimir Putin is said to have a security apparatus of hundreds of thousands of men. But yesterday, we witnessed boys with weapons and police officers in Moscow. Not security forces. Perhaps they were unseen. Perhaps they were not, because it’s a sham, a paper machier construction.

    That GRU, the Russian military intelligence, suffered losses in Ukraina was known before the intelligence leak this spring, but not how big. Washington Post analyzed papers and it seems (if I comprehend the scope correctly) GRU sent five brigades (5 * 900 soldiers) to Ukraine. Three of them have been virtually annihilated, one has been placed in the catastrophic fight for Vuhledar and suffered losses this year and, one has been slightly damaged by the war. These soldiers require at least four years of training and apparently they died like flies inside Ukraine. So much for their training.

    The “Chechen warriors” under Kadyrov raced to intercept Wagner. They live by their rumour, although they are deeply divided into Kadyrovites and Chechens who oppose Russia. Apparently the Kadyrovites use the rumour of being ferocious fighters, but are really not true. They have suffered losses in Ukraine, as they appear not to be more than boastful and erratic.

    In Sweden, there’s a diaspora waiting to return to Chechnya to fight Kadyrov and Russia, and other Chechens have joined the Ukrainian side so far, fighting what they deem are the traitors of Kadyrov.

    The Russian army has suffered staggering losses in Ukraine, with Wagner forces and airborne forces being the veterans, among the best survivors of the Russian forces so far. Could the paper tiger from Chechnya been able to do much against these veterans?

    Let’s not forget the Ukrainian attacks on Moscow, Belgorod and other places, revealing the leack of preparedness and competence in the Russian ranks.

    Prigozhin and Wagner sailed through Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh, in hours taking military headquarters with almost no resistance (that we know of). They were greeted by civilians, being given water, food and respect for being true to Russia. Putin must’ve panicked if he heard and saw that regular people in the vicinity of the war considers the war Putin wages as going completely wrong.

    My very basic, simple and amateurish guess is that Putin panicked. Prigozhin wasn’t going to hand over his only real possession, Wagner, after the new law, and he wasn’t going to end up in the infamous Lefortovo prison, being tortured and possibly executed by the FSB. So, he gambled. And the snake bit Putin’s hand.

    The Chechens weren’t able to intercept the Wagner forces, and it would’ve resulted in battles between them in many regions, with the Russian army inside Ukraine suffering from broken logistical lines and rotation. In Moscow, there’s no spetznaz forces to speak of, and my argument is that the veterans of Wagner would’ve decimated the “elite” forces, just like the Ukrainians decimated them. They’re also a paper tiger construction. Wagner would’ve conquered parts of Moscow, and Putin, not a brave man, would’ve fled before that, not being in control any longer in his train or his jet plane. The snake showed us that the emperor is all but draped in paper, nothing more.

    Putin had to aquiesce, revealing yet again that he is rather powerless, unable to win in Ukraine, unable to control a private military company opposing him. Even if Prigozhin were to suffer sooner or later, perhaps some of his soldiers are fiercely loyal and will take revenge? I fear the board is being set, inadvertenly, by many players, many more right extreme than Putin himself. He wanted to restore Russian glory, but will see Russia ripped to pieces if he doesn’t understand how to revert course now.

  • Sustainable war or Pandora’s Box in Russia?

    Sustainable war or Pandora’s Box in Russia?

    In recent weeks there’s been reports of several anti-Russian and/or Ukrainian units attacking villages around Belgorod, inside Russia, and last week Moscow was attacked by drones. The daughter of Alexander Dugin, Darya, was killed by a car bomb earlier this year, just like the military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky was killed in St Petersburg. Crimea has been attacked repeatedly, like Belgorod and other parts of Russia. There’s suspicions that Ukrainians blew up the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the Baltic sea. Several Russian leaders in occupied parts of Ukraine have been bombed or shot to death by partisans. And now the Kachovka dam.

    The dam has been under Russian control, and it seems plausible Russian neglect or stupidity blew up the dam, causing severe damage to large swaths of land. But many of the latter attacks seem to be directed by Ukrainians and in some cases, as in attacks on Crimea, officially directed by the Ukrainian government and/or military. Is this a sign of a sustainable war entering Russia?

    Sustainable war is a concept from the anime Ghost in the Shell: SAC_2045, where the powerful countries of the world launch a sustainable war to boost the global economy. Humans are primarily not attacked by warring states, but rather structures and equipment, by machines and mercenaries. I will alter the concept so as to incorporate the sustainability of a war, but a war that could be dangerous to humans as well.

    Ukraine has proved to be a very tough opponent for Russia. The Ukrainians have been able to kill and injure hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. They’ve also proved to be adept at using the Russian propaganda toolkit against the Russians themselves. First and foremost by gathering support of the most powerful country on the planet and the two strongest economic powers on the planet, as well as gaining support from South Korea and Japan. Finland and Sweden have abandoned neutrality. Again and again the Ukrainians have taunted and ridiculed the Russians in social media, interviews and press conferences. And now we’ve entered new territory in two ways.

    Firstly, the Ukrainians are using the Russian toolkit to spread fear and anxiety in parts of Russian society. They neither confirm nor deny attacks or events about to happen. No one is to be fully sure as to what’s really happening. Not even the Western countries, who in lack of evidence (and with evidence) will claim no damage is done and the Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves. This is the Russian playbook, turned against themselves repeatedly.

    Second, people are killed far from the border and the “special military operation”, Moscow itself is attacked and people with common sense will notice how the Russian military and leadership is unable to defend even the Kremlin, while their leader is hiding in a secret train. The New York Times reported on the city of Shebekino, a city in the vicinity of Belgorod with 40.000 inhabitants, that the Ukrainians has attacked and shelled. Virtually all people have fled and large parts of the city center have been destroyed by Ukraine. The Russians are incapable of defending the bordering regions.

    This is a very potent and dangerous combination: attack your enemy inside his own country, while claiming you didn’t do it. Or maybe you did. Use the enemies own propaganda toolkit and spread mistrust, anxiety and fear, again and again. Eventually, who are people to trust? Are they to trust anyone? Of course, the Russian people has lived under dictatorship, hardship and insecurity before. Propaganda and lies create apathy. Still, has the Russian leadership anything to live for if it cannot guarantee security? Even Stalin remained in Moscow when the Germans came and some citizens felt relief that he actually stayed, although he was feared and hated. But a leader who can’t even protect Moscow from stealthy, skilled Ukrainians, who is he?

    It might be that Vladimir Putin opened the Pandora’s Box with this war: a sustainable war he cannot end and cannot limit. How is he supposed to prevent the Ukrainians from fomenting rebellion in regions of Russia? How is he supposed to prevent Ukrainian attacks in such a large country, that even now cannot protect itself? The absolute majority of the Russian army was positioned inside Ukraine in March of 2022. The absolute majority of that army/military force is either dead or wounded now. Even with another round of mobilization, Putin cannot achieve security inside Russia, the Ukrainians will see to that. And using propaganda against the Russian population, who will they turn to? If this war continues for another year or couple of years, it might be that there’s a sustainable war raging inside Russia, with Ukrainian, Chechen, Georgian, Dagestan (to name a few) units in many more parts of Russia than now. Then, Putin can neither stop nor limit the war. It will continue, with bombings, assassinations, damage to infrastructure, levelled cities and villages, and no one knows when it will stop or when.

  • More on the history of Ukraine

    More on the history of Ukraine

    Lately I discovered that Yale University has released the entire series of lectures from a history class in the autumn of 2022 with Timothy Snyder: The Making of Modern Ukraine. 23 lectures on the history of Ukraine for free, with an entertaining Snyder! If you don’t wish to watch the episodes, you can listen to them as podcast episodes instead.

    In case you’re curious about the course reading, it’s all there as well. Give it a chance!

  • Book review: Chip war

    Book review: Chip war

    Once every couple of years (or months) you come across a topic you’ve never really been interested in, or perhaps haven’t even heard of. Or it’s a topic in the back of your head, that you’ve never been able to verbalize properly before. Suddenly it falls within scope and it is the only thing your mind is focused on for some time. After listening to The Ezra Klein Show with Chris Miller about his book Chip war, this has been the case for me. (Dmitri Alperovitch also talks to Miller on the Geopolitics Decanted podcast.)

    Semiconductors, you ask? Vaguely, you’ve heard of compontents crucial to technological infrastructure. Or phones, perhaps? You are right. Semiconductors are omnipresent in a technological society: phones, cars, computers, tablets, certain bins (!), satellites, dishwashers, speakers, washing machines, code locks, medical equipment – you name it. Since the 1950’s they’ve taken over society as a whole and most countries wouldn’t function properly without them. Semiconductors are in many ways the equivalent to oil – without it, no society. Chris Miller tells the story of how semiconductors were created, why they were created, and how they are used.

    Really, this is one of the best history books I ever read. And it’s not only about history, it’s not like your usual history book (I love history books)! It contains quite technical details of how semiconductors are constructed, and although it’s far from detailed (because it cannot be), it’s so intruiging and exciting I don’t want to lay down this book. I want it to continue endlessly. There are many aspects of the tech industry and the technological world I simply wish could disappear, so many dismal, awful and depressing aspects that haunt us and seem to increase each year. Read Ron Deibert’s Reset to get the state of the world. Generally, I have no high hopes for the future. In ways I do not really comprehend though, this books inspires hope. Perhaps it’s the implications of this specific piece of equipment, or the creation of the technology, or the suitable use and functions that allure to me.

    I cannot stop being impressed, even though I’m aware of the environmental and climate implications, of machines, that produce photolitography, comprised of almost 460.000 components, taking almost 20 years to develop, shooting objects through vacuum approximately 50.000 times each second. How can I not be impressed by the sheer (awesome) ingenuity to create a software program keeping track of every single component in one of the these machines, for it not to stall production? How do you track that many components? Of course I cannot be so impressed I lack the ability to review, but the storytelling and the technical details are impressive.

    History of semiconductors and Moore’s law

    The semiconductor itself stems from the US. Then it, generally, moved eastwards (BTW, a very cute game) to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the two latter the present superpowers in advanced semiconductors. See, there’s a difference between semiconductors and advanced semiconductors. The latter being inserted into machines general, while the later is used in more advanced machines or weapons.

    Most likely, you’ve heard of Moore´s law, based on the probablistic relationship between scientific progress and production, uttered by Gordon Moore (BTW, he died in March this year). Ostentatious is the scentific progress, but Miller stresses the workers efforts and import in doubling the number of transistors on a “chip” every two years. Without many dextrious, low wage women this “law” would never have occured.

    The anticipated fight between the superpowers: China vs US

    A portion of the book is dedicated to the conflict between China and the US, after the subsiding conflict between Japan and US in the (primarily) 1980’s and 1990’s. On the one hand, it’s fascinating, on the other, it’s completely terrifying. The conflicting sides compete for semiconductors, advanced semiconductors even more so, to fill their societies with computers, phones, gadgets and all the other things, but also competing for the military edge. Advanced weapons, semi-autonomous among them, are really scary, from your worst nightmare, and they’re becoming reality (I truly hope Eric Schmidt and Bob Work are right in that autonomous weapons are forbidden in every way and semi-autonomous weapons are subordinated humans).

    I’m happy to read that the swing in the US policy towards China changed parts due to Matt Pottinger. It confirms the view I hold of him being a good, knowledgable deputy national advisor. Generally I hold the view that the Trump administration was a disaster for the US (although several politically handpicked staff were talented and good), but this man was fantastic at his job. He lasted approximately 47 Scaramuccis.

    Very few companies are actually creating semiconductors, especially the advanced ones (TSMC, Samsung, UMC and GlobalFoundries), and only one create the blueprints, so to speak: ASML. This business is extremely concentrated. Drilling after oil can be done pretty much without advanced equipment, rudimentarily, but creating 14,8 billion transistors on one single chip is almost beyond conception of the mind and takes decades and billions of dollars in investment to complete, not to mention very skilled workers.

    Taiwan, together with South Korea and Japan, is at the very centre of this looming conflict. Without Taiwan, approximately 37 % of the advanced chips vanish and it would be disastrous to most of the industrial world, since these chips are part of industrial processes, military equipment (without them, no guidance), servers, and an abundance of other things.

    In Taiwan, some people argue they have a “silicon shield” protecting them from Chinese invasion. Why would China want to trigger a conflict, quickly sinking the world economy and advanced societies into a nightmare. Miller, however, argues that this shield is far from a guarantee, and I couldn’t agree more. Taiwan is perceived a province of China and too bold moves from the Taiwanese leadership and China will attack. Unfortunately, the situation is that simple.

    Superfluous summary

    Well. What can I say? This book is a must-read. If you wish to know more about semiconductors or the state of the world regarding semiconductors – read!

    Unfortunately, the book was issued when the CHIPS and Science Act was enacted and new export control measures on semiconductors were implemented, omitting these two very important steps in the conflict between China and the US. If you’re interested, listen to Alperovitch’s discussion with Miller in the aforementioned podcast.

    The single best aspect, an underestimated one, of this book’s layout is the short chapters. I cannot stress enough how much I appreciate chapters of approximately 10-15 pages each. For me, reading a book with hundreds of pages belonging to one single chapter isn’t a problem, but I find this layout so much easier, so much more appealing, to digest.

  • Book review: How to lose the information war

    Book review: How to lose the information war

    I first noticed Nina Jankowicz while reading the report Malign Creativity: How Gender, Sex, and Lies are Weaponized against Women Online. However, I didn’t know Nina was specialized in Central and Eastern Europe, that she has been stationed in Ukraina and knows Russian (thus also being able to understand Polish, Czech and Slovak). Her second book is focused on that same geographical region and, as the title implies, information warfare, directed by Russia. But she weaves the information war of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Poland and Ukraine with that of the US, and concentrates on the way to loose information war, but also how to try and tackle it.

    “With the advent of the internet and social media, individual citizens are now ‘news’ outlets themselves.” This fact countries like Russia uses against democracies in order to spread false narratives. In the introduction Nina gives us a more thorough dive into The Mueller Report about Russia’s interference prior under during to the presidental election of 2016. It was far more insidious and elaborate than arranging one protest and counterprotest at the same time and location. The Internet Research Agency (IRA) managed to run popular Facebook pages like Blacktivist and Being Patriot, as well as arrange unseemlingly fun and popular protests in Washington D.C.

    Nina takes us to five countries that in different ways have tried, and are trying, to fight against Russian information warfare: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Poland and Ukraine. In discussions with government officials, politicians and alternative media, she paints a picture of the different ways these countries try to combat Russian interference and pressure. These could provie the US with lessons on how to lose the information war.

    The lesson of lessons

    When it’s in front of you, it’s completely obvious. You ask yourself why you never saw it or verbally was able to say it out loud. Nina does just this. In the chapter of Estonia, she delves into the issue of the Russian minority, how it’s discriminated against and can’t be part of the Estonian society. This Russia uses to its advantage, to cast doubt on the Estonian government and majority. How to solve?

    Whenever we discuss issues related to technology, we tend to see technical solutions. Probably because the tech industry wants it no other way. Probably because we are entranced by technology, living in a technoreligious society, believing in technology as a good force in itself. So, why not simply throw in a tech solution to a tech problem? Like she writes: “How can any administration that intends to protect free speech censor the authentic opinions of its own citizens?”

    Why not solve this societal issue with a societal solution instead? Simply put: restore trust in government, give the minority chances to become part of the society as a whole. Try not to evoke bad feelings and animosity between people, heal the rifts. Two important pillars of media literacy (that Taiwan has tried) are schools, as in Finland, and public libraries and the powerful information and searchability librarians hold to guide citizens in the endless stream of information and literature. Thus Russia can no longer use this issue to splinter relations between people and create even bigger rifts. Because one thing Russia does is never to invent new issues, but use the old societal problems to sow discord and splinter society and the nation.

    Downsides

    Four downsides with the book:

    It was published just after Joe Biden was installed as president of the Unites States, thus missing the Biden administration’s take on cyber warfare, dual-use technologies, spyware and transnational repression. It differs from previous administrations.

    It was published one year before the Russian war against Ukraina in 2022, which renders some of the politics described obsolete. For instance, Estonia has once more turned more suspicious of the Russian minority, meaning that, for instance, the chapter on Estonia is not up to date, although it’s still relevant as a historical lesson. Settings for information warfare have changed rather drastically in one year.

    Somehow, I really dislike fictional writings “capturing” a technology and its implication in the present or future. Carissa Véliz does it in Privacy is power. Nina does it, and it’s erroneous, partly because it’s written before Biden’s presidency, partly because it’s the usual bleak, dry, predictable onset to an issue now, set in 2028.

    In the chapter about Ukrainian efforts to provide positive aspects of Ukraine in the Dutch election about EU-legislation should have been problematized more. Even though the Russians seemed to have played a part in negative campaigning, the Ukrainian part could also be considered foreign interference in an election. Julia Slupska’s piece on election interference is well-worth a read.

    Summary

    The book is true to its’ title. Information warfare pervades the book, and it doesn’t confuse information warfare with espionage or cyber warfare. Terms here are very important and so are the differences between them. Although Russia is the focal point, which narrows the scope of information warfare, that’s an advantage here. To write about information warfare in general or include Chinese, Iranian, American or any other country, would water it down. One can’t cover everything to make a topic or an issue interesting.

    Lessons from the book are important and relevant. Countries must learn from one another, can’t hide from information warfare, and develop a battery of counter measures. And those counter measures are seldom technological, but rather societal, economical and political. That’s the most important things I learned reading this book.